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Abstract  
 
Elections offer a privileged moment in representative democracy, when citizens have the 
opportunity to express their views, both on the track record of the incumbent government, as 
on the way the country should be governed in the future. Procedural fairness theory assumes 
that taking part in a decision making procedure that is perceived to be fair, strengthens the 
legitimacy of the entire decision making process. Most of the empirical research assumes that 
the attitudinal effects of elections are mainly due to the fact that one’s preferred party wins the 
elections. In multi-party systems, however, such a clear distinction is not always possible and 
therefore it is hypothesized that the winner-loser-logic is weaker in this kind of party system. 
In this study we rely on a Belgian panel study to ascertain how electoral participation has an 
effect on political trust. The results show that in a proportional system all voters rise in political 
trust, following their participation in elections. The winner-loser effect is not significant. 
Furthermore, the analyses suggest that especially the respondents with the initially lowest trust 
levels gain most by participating in elections. The theoretical implication of this finding is that 
apparently elections are still considered to be an important and legitimate linkage mechanism 
between citizens and the political system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is little doubt that free and fair elections are being considered by a vast majority of 
citizens as the most quintessential characteristic of democracy (Bingham Powell, 2000; Norris, 
2014). Despite a trend towards a stronger emphasis on non-institutionalized forms of political 
participation, citizens still assume that taking part in elections is the single most effective tool 
they have available to exert their influence on political decision making (Hooghe & Marien, 
2014). Both in the literature as in public opinion, there seems to be a consensus that free and 
fair elections are an absolute minimum requirement in order to qualify as a democracy. If this 
is correct, one could assume that elections play a crucial role in the current debate on democratic 
legitimacy (Dahl, 1989; Thomassen, 2014). 
Nevertheless, it is striking that research on the question how elections contribute to 
democratic legitimacy in general is very scattered (Finkel, 1985). Most of the available research 
focuses on the question how citizens respond when their preferred party or candidate loses the 
election (Anderson et al., 2005). In this line of research, authors routinely depart from a 
dichotomous view, whereby parties and voters can be divided in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. In this 
winner-loser debate, the focus is not on elections as such, but rather on the effect of winning or 
losing elections, which is something altogether different. Within the winner-loser debate, the 
focus is no longer on the effects of procedures, but rather on the effects of the outcomes of these 
procedures. The idea that everyone could have a positive view on the democratic merits of free 
and fair elections, rather remarkably, is almost completely missing in this literature (Esaiasson, 
2011). Nevertheless, a general assumption is that political participation can generate significant 
changes in attitudes: ‘participation is not only instrumental in nature, but also developmental, 
furthering certain desirable individual qualities and attitudes quite apart from achieving any 
concrete political objective’ (Finkel, 1987, p. 441). This is a peculiar omission in the literature, 
because in consociational democracies, the goal is exactly to try to avoid that specific groups 
of the population will be perennial losers in the struggle for power (Lijphart, 2012). Within this 
literature there is very little attention for the fact that almost by definition supporters for the 
winning party (and in a proportional system that should be a majority of voters), most likely 
will develop more trust in the system, as they will be satisfied with the outcome of the elections. 
By focusing on political trust as a form of diffuse support for the political system and its 
fundamental values, our claim is that the legitimacy effect of elections should not be limited to 
supporters of the winning party. 
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The question on how elections contribute to democratic legitimacy is relevant, first of 
all because there is a clear concern about low or even eroding levels of democratic legitimacy 
in the literature. Secondly, however, it is stressed quite frequently that elections have lost most 
of their effectiveness in connecting citizens to the democratic decision making process. Because 
of electoral dealignment, fewer citizens express a stable party preference and therefore it is 
often assumed that they have only a weaker interest in the electoral process itself 
(Dassonneville, 2012). If that would be the case, the obvious consequence should be that 
elections do not contribute all that much to democratic legitimacy, and maybe there should be 
more attention for alternative forms of participation like deliberative or direct democracy. The 
challenge for the alternative forms of participation however is quite steep, as they have to 
outperform elections. The current practice of electoral democracy, however, embodies a very 
basic democratic principle that was already present in the work of Bentham: ‘Everybody is to 
count for one, nobody for more than one’. Earlier research indeed shows that fairness, stability 
and proportionality are considered by public opinion as important qualities of an electoral 
system (Curtice & Seyd, 2011). If a rather traditional and tested procedure like free and fair 
elections would contribute to democratic legitimacy, the challenge for democratic innovation 
efforts is to contribute at least as strong to democratic legitimacy.  
  
Furthermore, elections stand out as the most visible manifestation of politics within society. 
One of the merits of elections is that they render visible (and sometimes even attractive) the 
often abstract struggle on procedures, principles and ideological preferences. Partly because of 
the contest and the theatrical elements involved with elections, mass media devote a 
disproportional amount of time to electoral campaigns, Election Day itself, and the reaction of 
leading politicians. This peak attention could imply that even for groups who usually do not 
pay any attention at all to politics, it becomes almost impossible to avoid being exposed to 
political news. In the run up to the 2014 elections in Belgium, the national networks devoted 
46 per cent of their total news broadcast time to information about the upcoming elections (De 
Smedt & Walgrave, 2014). This huge amount of media attention is by itself theoretically 
relevant. Zaller (1992) assumes that most citizens are not that strongly interested in politics on 
a day to day basis. Only exceptionally they will be exposed to all the drama that is associated 
with elections (Chou, Bleiker & Premaratnab, 2016). However, exactly because they do not 
have a routine involvement in politics, this peak exposure should have the strongest impact 
(Zaller, 1992). Because of this massive exposure, one could assume that any attitudinal effects 
elections might have, will not remain limited to a small group of the population. 
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In this paper, we first review the literature on the winner-loser debate, before developing 
the argument why elections do not always fit this logic. Subsequently we present data and 
methods, before we present some conclusions on the attitudinal consequences of elections in a 
proportional electoral system. 
 
2. Beyond winners and losers 
 
Within the literature on the attitudinal consequences of electoral participation, the guiding 
assumption is that these effects are ultimately dependent on the results of the elections. To 
summarize it all too crudely: those who win the elections will be satisfied, and those who lose 
will be dissatisfied (Clarke & Acock, 1989). Theoretically, two fundamental objections can be 
made against this assumption. Firstly, it is assumed that elections usually lead to clearly 
identifiable winners and losers, which is not always the case, especially in proportional electoral 
systems. Secondly, this line of research remains completely oblivious to the fact that the 
procedure by itself might have an effect on the perceived trustworthiness of the political system. 
If voters have sufficient reason to believe in the integrity and the fairness of the electoral system, 
this should trump their potential disappointment about the results of the elections. Finley (1985, 
1987), then, finds that participating in elections increases the support for the regime and the 
external efficacy of voters – without distinguishing between winners and losers. Before we 
develop these two arguments further, we first provide a brief overview of the literature on 
attitudinal effects of electoral participation. 
The dominant tradition in this line of research assumes that if elections would produce 
any changes in the level of political trust, these are mainly due to the results of the elections, 
with winners becoming more trusting in the system, and losers becoming more distrustful 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). A recurring expectation in the literature is that only voters who 
are in favour of the winning party would have a reason to become more trusting, as a direct 
consequence of the election result (Singh, Lago & Blais, 2011). For Germany, it was shown 
that the better the party performed, the stronger the positive effect on political trust (Singh, 
Karakoç, & Blais, 2012). Ugues and Medina Vidal (2015) even go a step further by suggesting 
that supporting a winning political party determines the perception of fairness of the electoral 
system. It has to be noted, however, that their study was conducted in Mexico, a political system 
that obtains relatively low scores on perceptions of political integrity. For the United States 
Craig et al. (2006) have shown that supporters of the losing party actually lose trust in the 
political system. Here too, however, the analysis dealt with very exceptional circumstances, i.e., 
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the heavily contested 2000 presidential elections, where ultimately the Supreme Court had to 
decide on the validity of the votes that had been casted. In that specific case, the US voters 
indeed had very good reasons to doubt the integrity of the electoral process. 
Two observations stand out after this review. Firstly, most of the analyses on the winner-
loser effect have been conducted in two-party systems, where there usually are clearly 
identifiable ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Beaudonnet et al., 2014). If the Democrats gain control of 
the White House, this automatically implies that the Republicans lose control of the highest 
office. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this logic can be generalized toward all 
electoral contexts. In multi-party systems it might be much more cumbersome to determine who 
is ‘winning’ and who is ‘losing’. It is, e.g., perfectly possible that a party gains votes and seats, 
but in the end does not enter the governing coalition. Thus far, there is very little research on 
countries with a proportional electoral system and an accompanying multi-party system. Quite 
often, this kind of electoral system will also result in government coalitions, which again makes 
it harder to identify clearly who wins and who loses. To summarize it: these kind of political 
systems should be seen as ‘kinder and gentler’ (Lijphart, 2012), and with regard to electoral 
results this means that often there will not be clear losers. Given the overall context of power 
sharing, changes most likely will be much more incremental. While the Westminster model 
departs from a clear antagonism between the main political groups, in a consociational regime, 
there is no reason to assume that this antagonism would be equally strong. Esaiasson (2011) 
argues that supporters of a losing party will only lose trust in the political system if the electoral 
defeat could lead to negative consequences for their legitimate interests. In a consociational 
system, most likely this will not be the case, as even losing parties remain structurally involved 
in power-sharing schemes. 
A second observation is that in this literature, there is hardly any attention for the effect 
of the electoral procedure as such: ‘While there have been numerous empirical studies of the 
causal determinants of voting behavior and other acts of political participation, political 
scientists have virtually ignored the consequences of such activity for the individual’ (Finkel, 
1985, p. 891). Procedural fairness theory, however, would allow us to predict that taking part 
in a fair procedure consolidates trust, no matter what the outcomes of the procedure will be 
(Tyler, 2011). In this case, it is clear that the status of elections is almost sacrosanct. Opinion 
research shows time and again that free and fair elections are being considered as the most 
important defining element of what a democracy is all about (Hooghe & Oser, 2016). 
Furthermore, if the electoral process is seen as fair and neutral, this leads to a higher propensity 
to voter turnout (Birch, 2010). When this electoral integrity is in doubt, this usually leads to 
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massive protest in public opinion (Norris, 2011). The way in which the US Supreme Court 
handled the contested presidential elections in Florida in the year 2000, e.g., clearly had a 
negative effect on trust in the basic institutions of the US political system (Nicholson & 
Howard, 2003). If we take along these insights about the importance of the electoral procedure 
itself, it is clear that the attitudinal consequences of electoral participation should not be just 
dependent on the results, but should also be directly affected by the procedure as such. Within 
the European Union, these effects should be positive, as there are no fundamental complaints 
about a lack of electoral integrity (Norris, Martínez & Grömping, 2015). 
An important methodological consideration in this regard is that quite often there is a 
tautological relation in these studies. Most of the studies use satisfaction with the current 
administration, or satisfaction with the way democracy works as their main dependent variable. 
Singh et al. (2012), e.g., use a 0 to 10-scale to probe how satisfied respondents are with the way 
democracy works. While this measurement of support for the political regime has also 
frequently been used in other studies (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Esaiasson, 2011; Curini, 
Jou, & Memoli, 2012), it has also been said to be ‘obviously an imperfect measure of support 
for the political regime’ (Blais & Gélineau, 2007, p. 428). Almost by definition this kind of 
variable is heavily influenced by whom the current office-holders are. If I am a Conservative, 
and the elections are being won by a Labour candidate, there is not all that much reason for me 
to be satisfied with the current Labour cabinet. Democratic legitimacy, however, is not related 
to satisfaction with the current office-holders. Diffuse support refers to the basic principles and 
institutions of a political system, and it should not be dependent on preferences for the current 
office holders (Easton, 1965). What is much more important in this regard is a normative 
consensus about the basic principles of the democratic system and its governing rules (Marien, 
2011; Van Elsas, 2015). Previous research has shown that questions about ‘satisfaction with 
democracy in your country’ fail to capture this more fundamental consensus, while questions 
on political trust are much more likely to measure these values. Therefore, it is important that 
in this line of research, one does not just focus on satisfaction with current office-holders, but 
one should also pay attention to the basic value of political trust in the system. 
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3. Data and methods 
 
In an effort to expand research beyond the traditional majoritarian electoral systems, we will 
make use of electoral survey data from Belgium. The country has a very proportional system, 
and in fact the most widely used method for proportional seat allocation, the method D’Hondt, 
was first developed in Belgium, and it has been applied in the country ever since 1899. Belgium 
is a typical example of a consociational democracy, with elaborated power sharing mechanisms 
and a tradition of elite compromise (Lijphart, 2012). It is a founding member of the European 
Union, with an average score on indicators like political trust. Within the European Union, it 
also receives an average score with regard to electoral integrity (Norris, Martínez & Grömpung, 
2015, p. 9). There is no reason to assume, therefore, that Belgium would offer a very special 
case. The proportionality of the Belgian electoral system renders it likely that this will be 
perceived as a fair procedure (Bingham Powell, 2000). The proportional procedure reflects the 
basic moral role that was already expressed in the work of Bentham, that every person is to 
count for one, and nobody for more than one (Blau, 2004). 
 
To examine whether the proposed hypotheses hold, this study uses the Belgian Election Panel 
(2009-2014) study (Dassonneville, Falk Pedersen, Grieb, & Hooghe, 2014). This four-wave 
panel study consists of a representative sample of the Belgian electorate. Starting in the weeks 
before the elections of 7 June 2009, a sample of 4,863 Belgian voters was drawn from the 
Belgian National Register, 2,331 of which were interviewed face-to-face. Subsequently, 1,698 
of these respondents were interviewed again in the weeks after Election Day. This panel design 
allows us to measure the evolution in political trust on an individual level between before and 
after the elections. Moreover, the panel study was continued in 2014. In the weeks leading to 
the elections of 25 May 2014, the same sample of respondents was contacted to continue the 
panel study. 1,542 of the contacted respondents completed the (mail) survey. Finally, 707 
respondents took part in the post-electoral survey wave. We will concentrate mostly on the 2009 
waves, because of the large number of respondents, but in an additional robustness test we will 
also ascertain whether we obtain the same results when analysing the two waves that were 
conducted at the occasion of the 2014 elections. The risk of a panel design, however, is panel 
attrition, rendering the sample less representative. The attrition rate for this specific panel is in 
line with that of other panel studies that cover an extensive period of time (Dassonneville et al., 
2014). Moreover, As Dabros et al. (2015) note, the more highly educated and knowledgeable 
respondents are more likely to continue participating in the study, and it are also these 
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respondents that are expected to be most stable in their attitudes. Therefore, the current data 
should provide a conservative test of changes in political trust. It has to be noted that the 2009 
elections were regional elections, but given the strong federal nature of the Belgian political 
system, and the involvement of the leading politicians as candidates, these can be considered 
first-order elections (Deschouwer, 2012). In 2014, Belgium held elections for the federal, 
regional and European level, all on the same day.  
 
3.1. Dependent variable 
In order to measure diffuse support for the political system, we will rely on a scale measuring 
trust in the major political institutions. Following the Eastonian framework, it can be assumed 
that this kind of scale is closer to the theoretical notion of diffuse support for the political system 
than questions on satisfaction with the way democracy works, that are more prone to be unduly 
influenced by opinions on the current incumbent. Dabros et al. (2015, p. 1002), e.g., rely on the 
survey question: ‘How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in 
Washington, DC, to do what is right?’ The direct reference to Washington DC renders it almost 
inevitable that responds will be primed to think about the current federal government and 
therefore it should come as no surprise that this question has been shown to be highly influenced 
by the winner-loser effect. The political trust scale, on the other hand, refers to the basic 
principles and institutions of the political system, and therefore one could expect it to be much 
more robust against the winner-loser effect. 
Therefore, we constructed a scale consisting of the answers on five questions. 
Respondents were asked to indicate how much trust they have on a scale ranging from 0 (no 
trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) towards the five institutions which were probed in each wave 
of the study: political parties, the regional parliament, the federal government, the federal 
parliament, and politicians. These different measures are expected to measure one latent attitude 
of political trust. This assumption is tested by including these five items in a principal 
component analysis (Table 1). 
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As can be observed in Table 1, the different items load on one same latent concept. The 
eigenvalue and the Cronbach’s alpha indicate a reliable scale. The results of the principal 
component analysis demonstrate that the political trust scale is one-dimensional and internally 
coherent, as is also the case in previous European research (Marien, 2011). As such it can be 
considered as a reliable measurement. We then construct a sum scale adding the scores on the 
different variables and dividing them by the number of items. Since we are interested in the 
effect of electoral participation on political trust, the dependent variable is the increase or 
decrease in this sum scale of trust of the respondent after the elections. Therefore, we follow 
the method used by Blais and Gélineau (2007) and Esaiasson (2011) and we construct a 
difference score of the reported trust after (wave 2) and before the elections (wave 1) for each 
respondent.1 Since in this way every individual is included once in the data and so observations 
are independent, we will use Ordinary Least Squares regression to estimate our effects. Table 
2 provides an overview of the evolution in trust. 
Table 2. Evolution in trust levels 
 2009 Mean Std. Dev. 2014 Mean Std. Dev. 
Trust wave before   4.99 1.517   4.57 1.864 
Trust wave after   5.80 1.485   5.71 1.604 
Difference before-after +0.81 1.476 +1.14 1.582 
Entries are mean score on trust for respondents taking part in the first and second waves of the BEP 
2009-2014 Study (n=1622 in 2009 and 624 in 2014). 
 
                                                          
1. The analyses were also conducted using the trust reported after the elections (wave 2) as 
dependent variable, controlling for pre-electoral levels of trust (wave 1). The results remain the 
same as participation has a positive significant effect and none of the operationalisations of 
winners and losers has a significant effect. 
Table 1. Political trust scale 
How much do you trust… 
Wave 1 
 (pre-
electoral 
2009) 
Wave 2  
(post-
electoral 
2009) 
Wave 3 
 (pre-
electoral 
2014) 
Wave 4 
 (post-
electoral 
2014) 
Factor Political parties 0.848 0.835 0.896 0.879 
loading Regional Parliament 0.778 0.803 0.852 0.839 
 Federal government 0.827 0.848 0.918 0.853 
 Federal Parliament 0.848 0.879 0.923 0.870 
 Politicians 0.821 0.839 0.865 0.878 
Eigenvalue 3.400 3.549 3.971 3.730 
Cronbach’s α 0.882 0.896 0.935 0.914 
Entries are the result of a principal component analysis. BEP 2009-2014, n= 1622 in 2009 and n= 624 in 
2014. Results were equivalent in the French (n=729/257) and Dutch (n=893/367) language subsamples. 
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3.2. Independent variables 
Research towards winners and losers in elections has taken different approaches of how to 
operationalise whether a party wins or loses an election. One approach is to consider parties 
who entered a coalition and thus are part of the new government as winning parties, since 
governing is considered to be one of the prior objectives of political parties (Anderson et al., 
2005; Curini et al., 2012). Singh et al. (2012, p. 206), investigating different forms of ‘winning’, 
claim: ‘winning basically means being in government’. In a two-party system it is usually quite 
easy to identify winners and losers in an election cycle. In a multi-party system as Belgium, this 
is not necessarily the case. The process of forming a governing coalition in Belgium is usually 
quite cumbersome, and the 2009 and 2014 elections were no exception to this. In the Dutch 
language region, coalitions were formed 36 days after the election in 2009, and 61 days in 2014. 
In the French language region, this was resp. 38 days and 58 days. This means that during most 
of the post-electoral fieldwork, respondents did not know yet what the composition of the 
governing coalition would be, so this could not have had an effect on their levels of political 
trust. Entering a governing coalition, therefore, in this study cannot be used as an indicator for 
winning an election. 
To identify whether the winner-loser effect exists in multi-party systems, we will test 
different operationalisations, thereby taking on the challenge of Anderson et al. (2005, p. 34) to 
‘disentangle the meaning and import of other definitions’ of winners and losers. On the one 
hand, we will use trichotomies of whether parties lost (-1) or gained (+1) seats or not (0), and 
whether they lost or gained percentages of the vote. On the other hand, winning or losing was 
also operationalized as a continuous variable, using the shift in percentage of the vote as a 
variable. Since what matters for elections is the actual share of seats in Parliament, we also used 
still a different operationalisation, focusing on the seat shift, i.e. the number of seats won or 
lost. For the Dutch language community, there is one specific problem: the Nationalists and the 
Christian-Democrats in 2004 entered the election in a pre-electoral cartel. This means that we 
do not have a sound comparison basis for the 2009 results. To solve this problem, the members 
of this parliamentary group in 2008 were divided according to their party affiliation, and this 
was taken as the initial point of comparison.2 
Next to this winner or loser status, our main variable of interest is whether the 
respondent turned out and casted a valid vote. Since our hypothesis states that the mere fact that 
                                                          
2. In an additional test, we excluded Flemish Nationalist and Christian Democratic voters, and 
in that scenario, the winner-loser effect still remains non-significant.  
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one participated in elections – irrespective of whether their preferred party won or lost – raises 
the level of political trust, we expect respondents who turned out to have a significantly larger 
increase in trust than respondents who did not in a valid manner. Some research suggests that 
especially those who did not vote will lose trust in the political system (Rich, 2015). Therefore, 
we created the dichotomous variable ‘participation’, with a score of 0 if the respondent indicates 
not to have turned out (2.90% of the respondents) and a score of 1 if the respondent indicates 
to have voted for one of the running parties. It has to be noted that turning out in Belgium is 
compulsory with as a result a turnout rate of well above 90 per cent. Therefore, we consider 
casting a blanc vote (1.36% of the respondents) as well as an invalid vote (0.68%) as a sign not 
wanting to participate but just to turn out to vote as a result of the legal obligation. 
Consequently, casting a blanc vote or an invalid vote too are coded as 0, making ‘participation’ 
a comparison between those voters who did not turn out or did so but casted a blanc or invalid 
vote, and voters who turned out and voted for a party.3 Since non-voters are underrepresented 
in the data, the analyses are weighted to reported turnout. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Self-evidently, we also include various control variables. In line with previous research, the 
classic control variables that are included are gender (0= male; 1= female), age and educational 
level. The latter is included as a categorical variable in which the reference category consists of 
respondents who did not have any education or only a primary education. The first category in 
the analysis consists of respondents having completed secondary education, and the second of 
respondents having obtained a tertiary degree.  
It has to be remembered that Belgium basically has two distinct party systems as totally 
different parties compete in the Dutch as in the French speaking of the country. Furthermore, 
we know that political trust levels are lower in the French region than in the Dutch region 
(Hooghe & Dassonneville, forthcoming). The language group of the respondent will therefore 
serve as a control variable (0= French; 1= Dutch). 
It also has to be remembered that Belgium is one of the few countries in the world that 
practices compulsory voting (Deschouwer, 2012). The result of this legal system is that turnout 
                                                          
3. We also conducted the analyses with the dichotomy between turning out or not, thus with 
respondents who casted a blanc or invalid vote also scoring 1 on participation. While winner-
loser status still does not render significant results in the full models, the effect of participation 
loses its significance. It has to be noted, however, that the group of respondents not turning out 
is very small (n=47; 2.90%), and consequently there is not much variance in this variable. 
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rates in the country remain rather stable at ca. 90 per cent of the eligible population. This does 
imply that a substantial part of the Belgian electorate most likely only turns out to vote because 
of the legal obligation. Therefore, it is standard practice to use a question on the likelihood 
whether voters would still turn out to vote if compulsory voting would be abolished in the 
country. Previous analyses have shown that this hypothetical question leads to results that are 
very similar to the stratification that results from an actual abolishment of compulsory voting, 
like the Netherlands has done in 1970 (Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 1998). The variable is coded as a 
dummy with respondents indicating that they would never or sometimes turn out if it weren’t 
compulsory anymore with code 0, and respondents indicating that they would turn out most of 
the times or always coded as 1.4 
Research has indicated that voters of different levels of political sophistication 
experience the electoral race in different ways (Zaller, 1992). Therefore we also control for the 
respondent’s level of political knowledge by constructing a sum scale of the score on five 
factual questions. Furthermore, we control for the extent to which the respondent was exposed 
to the electoral campaign. Therefore, respondents were asked how intensively they followed 
the campaign on a scale ranging from not at all over not so intensive and intensive to very 
intensive. 
 
4. Results 
 
As a first exploratory test, we plot the evolution in trust before and after the elections for the 
winners and losers of the elections respectively in Figure 1. For this figure, we distinguished 
between winners and losers as whether the party the respondent voted for gained (winner) or 
lost (loser) seats in the respective elections. As can be seen in Figure 1, regardless of whether 
one voted for a winning or losing party, we can observe a similarly rising level of political trust. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4. As a test, the analysis was also conducted with only the respondents indicating they would 
‘always’ continue to turn out as code 1. The results are substantially the same in that the variable 
voluntary turnout has a significant positive effect on the evolution of political trust. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of political trust before and after elections, for winners 
and losers, 2009 and 2014 
 
Figure depicts average political trust levels, before and after elections. ‘Winner’ = voted for a party that gained 
seats in that specific elections; ‘Loser’ = voted for a party that lost seats in that specific elections. Both in 2009 
and 2014, and both for ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, the difference between the average score before the elections, and 
the average score after the elections is significant at the .001 level. 
Second, we present a bivariate overview of results. As can be observed in Table 3, there are 
marked differences between the electorates of the various parties. The highest levels of political 
trust can be observed among the voters for the traditionally largest parties, i.e., the Christian 
Democrats in the Dutch region, and the Socialist Party in the French region of the country. 
What is more important given the scope of the current article, however, is that among the 
electorates of all parties we do find a significant rise between the political trust levels observed 
before the elections, and the ones observed after the elections. Only for the rather limited group 
of respondents that did not take part in the elections, or did cast a blank/invalid vote, we do not 
observe a significant difference. This provides some first support to our claim that participating 
in elections in a valid way raises the voter’s level of political trust. 
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Table 3. Evolution in political trust for voters of the different parties (2009) 
 
 N Before elections 
After  
elections 
Difference 
D
u
tc
h
 
Christian-Democrats 253 5.39 6.37 +0.98*** 
Greens   49 5.25 5.90 +0.65* 
Nationalists 150 5.00 5.73 +0.73*** 
Socialists 135 5.29 5.98 +0.69*** 
Extreme Right   67 4.11 4.90 +0.79** 
Liberals 109 5.43 6.03 +0.60** 
Libertarian Party   50 4.35 5.58 +1.23*** 
F
re
n
ch
 Socialists 200 5.23 6.26 +1.02*** 
Liberals 147 4.71 5.65 +0.94*** 
Christian-Democrats 106 5.21 5.94 +0.73*** 
Greens 177 4.75 5.52 +0.77*** 
 Other   39 4.92 5.42 +0.49 
Abstention   47 4.71 5.22 +0.52 
Invalid/blanc   33 3.64 3.86 +0.21 
Refuses answer   60 4.29 4.96 +0.68 
All respondents 1622 4.99 5.80 +0.81*** 
Source: BEP 2009-2014. Entries are mean scores on political trust for respondents taking part in the 
first and second wave of the BEP 2009-2014 Study.  
Note: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
 
We now turn to an estimation of the effects of participation and of being a winner or loser in 
the evolution in political trust. The results are summarized in Table 4.5 The data are weighted 
according to age and gender. Since we are measuring participation, the data are also weighted 
to electoral results. In Model 1, following Singh et al. (2012), we control for floor and ceiling 
effects by including pre-election trust. In Model 2, we include our main variable of interest: 
whether the respondent turned out to cast a (valid) vote. As can be seen in Table 4, having 
participated in the elections significantly increases the difference in trust before and after the 
elections, also when controlling for the level of trust before Election Day. Including this 
variable also adds to the explained variance. In Model 3, the winner-loser variable is included 
to investigate whether the evolution in trust differs between winners and losers. In Model 3 of 
Table 4 we therefore include one of the possible operationalisations of winners and losers; the 
number of seats the party the respondent voted for lost or gained. As displayed by the not 
significant coefficient in Model 3, gaining or losing seats has no impact on the evolution of 
trust, and it then also does not contribute to the explained variance. Also controlling for this 
winner-loser distinction, participation, however, still significantly increases political trust. In 
Model 4, we include our control variables to test whether the effect of participation still holds 
                                                          
5. The models are tested on problems of multicollinearity. No violations occurred; the highest 
VIF amounts 1.63, the average VIF amounts 1.22. 
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when controlling for other possible determinants of a change in trust. Looking at the control 
variables, the results indicate that for voters who would still continue to turn out, even if it was 
not compulsory anymore, political trust increases significantly more than for those voters who 
would not turn out anymore. Also campaign exposure significantly increases the evolution in 
trust. 
Most interestingly, however, is the still significant positive result of participation; also 
controlling for other variables expected to influence the evolution in political trust, this effect 
indicates that participation in elections significantly increases political trust. Moreover, the 
winner-loser variable remains out of reach of any level of significance. This provides strong 
evidence for our hypothesis that in a multi-party system winning and losing is ambiguous and 
the mere participation in elections increases the political trust of the voters. 
 
Table 4. Multivariate regression explaining evolution in political trust 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pre-election trust level -0.482*** 
(0.035) 
-0.513*** 
(0.035) 
-0.515*** 
(0.034) 
-0.552*** 
(0.037) 
Participation 
 
0.799*** 
(0.224) 
0.806*** 
(0.223) 
0.675** 
(0.231) 
Winner-Loser (difference in 
seats) 
  
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Gender (1=female) 
   
0.124 
(0.090) 
Age 
   
0.003 
(0.002) 
Non/primary education (ref.)     
   Secondary education 
   
0.042 
(0.112) 
   Tertiary education 
   
-0.002 
(0.114) 
Region (1= Dutch region) 
   
-0.036 
(0.090) 
Would vote without obligation 
   
0.297** 
(0.106) 
Political knowledge 
   
-0.019 
(0.030) 
Campaign exposure 
   
0.160* 
(0.160) 
Constant 3.177*** 
(0.190) 
2.605*** 
(0.289) 
2.610*** 
(0.288) 
2.421*** 
(0.337) 
R2 0.267 0.298 0.299 0.317 
N 1483 1440 1440 1435 
Source: BEP 2009-2014. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors between 
brackets. Note: *: p≤0.05; **: p≤0.01; ***: p≤0.001 
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An intriguing finding in the analysis reported in Table 4 is that there is a strong negative effect 
of the initial level of political trust. To express it differently: the lower the initial score on the 
political trust scale, the more respondents have gained in the second observation. This kind of 
effect immediately suggests a ceiling effect, but a closer inspection of the figures reveals this is 
not the case: only 17 respondents (1.05%) obtained a trust-score equal to or higher than 8. For 
this very limited group, indeed, no further growth is possible. For all the other respondents, on 
the other hand, a growth in political trust levels is possible, but the ones with the initially lowest 
levels still seem to benefit most strongly from the electoral experience. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution in political trust for initial trust levels (2009) 
 
Source: BEP 2009-2014. Entries are mean scores on political trust of eight equal groups of respondents.  
 
As stated, different operationalisations of winning and losing are possible, and the analyses in 
Table 4 used just one of the possible operationalisations: how many seats the party the voter 
voted for gained or lost. To test whether our results hold when alternative definitions are used, 
the analysis was also conducted with different alternative operationalisations. The two left 
columns of Table 5 include the coefficients of participation and winner or loser for the 
respective Model 3 and Model 4 from Table 4. The same variables as in the models of Table 4 
were included, but in order to save space only the coefficients of interest are reported here.  
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First, we used the percentage of votes the party gained or lost relative to the previous elections. 
Since this can be any percentage between -100 and 100, we included it as a continuous variable. 
As can be seen in Table 5, also with this alternative operationalisation, being a winner or a loser 
does not significantly influence the evolution in trust. Moreover, participation does have a 
significant positive impact on political trust in both models. The next two alternative 
operationalisations consist of a trichotomy, indicating whether a party lost (-1), gained (+1) or 
neither (0) seats or votes respectively. As the results indicate, these alternative definitions all 
support our hypothesis that not winner-loser-status but participation in the elections 
significantly boosts political trust. Apparently, and no matter how ‘winner-loser’ is 
operationalised, in a proportional system like Belgium, the winner-loser status does not seem 
to have an effect. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
 
An alternative explanation could be that we are measuring a rather different dynamic within the 
electoral cycle. During the electoral campaign, candidates and parties tend to spread negative 
information about their opponents, and one might consider this to erode trust in the political 
Table 5. Impact of participation with different operationalisations of winner-
loser 
  2009 2014 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
Percentage 
continuous 
Participation 0.804*** 
(0.224) 
0.674** 
(0.231) 
1.183*** 
(0.353) 
0.837** 
(0.300) 
Winner-loser 0.010 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
R2 0.299 0.318 0.368 0.469 
N 1440 1435 347 342 
Seat 
trichotomy 
Participation 0.831*** 
(0.245) 
0.734** 
(0.253) 
1.201*** 
(0.350) 
0.836** 
(0.296) 
Winner-loser 0.023 
(0.071) 
0.044 
(0.072) 
0.018 
(0.075) 
-0.007 
(0.073) 
R2 0.298 0.317 0.365 0.469 
N 1440 1435 348 343 
Percentage 
trichotomy 
Participation 0.779** 
(0.251) 
0.677** 
(0.257) 
1.200*** 
(0.350) 
0.832** 
(0.297) 
Winner-loser -0.013 
(0.077) 
0.004 
(0.075) 
-0.006 
(0.074) 
-0.033 
(0.071) 
R2 0.298 0.317 0.365 0.469 
N 1440 1435 348 343 
Source: BEP 2009-2014. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors between 
brackets. Note: *: p≤0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p≤0.001 
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system. The apparent surge we observe immediately following the elections, therefore, might 
just be that levels of trust return to a normal level, after being eroded during the electoral 
campaign. We cannot directly test this assumption, as this would require a series of observations 
of the same individuals during the electoral campaign, and these repeated observations by 
themselves might have an effect on attitudes. However, the fact that the fieldwork for the 
elections extended over a longer period of time allows us to set a kind of rolling average during 
the electoral campaign. Figure 3 plots the average reported trust throughout the campaign 
grouped per three days. As can be seen in Figure 3, there is no indication at all that average 
levels of political trust would decline during the electoral campaign. As such, we do not find 
any indications for the claim that the campaign activity by itself would have a negative effect 
on levels of political trust. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of political trust throughout the electoral campaign 
 
Average score on political trust, respondents grouped per three days during the electoral campaign. 
 
It could also be argued that the 2009 elections would be highly exceptional, as there were no 
extreme vote shifts between parties. However, the volatility indices for these elections were not 
exceptional compared to other Belgian elections. Furthermore, as stated we use a panel study 
spanning two electoral cycles: 2009 and 2014. The results so far are calculated only for the 
elections of 2009. Since the findings might be caused by effects related to these specific 
elections, a comparison with the same analyses for the 2014 election provides a robustness 
check for the results reported above. Therefore, the same analyses are conducted for the pre- 
and post-electoral waves of the panel study in 2014. Table 6 provides an overview of the effects 
of the variables of interest similar to Table 4. Just as for the analyses on the data for 2009, we 
present the different models with the operationalisation of winners and losers as the number of 
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seats the party the respondent voted for gained or lost. Also in line with the analyses of 2009, 
we present the results of the analyses with alternative operationalisations of winners and losers 
separately. These results are included in the two right columns of Table 5, and as can be seen 
observations are very similar to those for 2009. 
 
Table 6. Multivariate regression explaining evolution in political trust 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pre-election trust -0.145*** 
(0.079) 
-0.430*** 
(0.063) 
-0.429*** 
(0.034) 
-0.508*** 
(0.049) 
Participation 
 
1.200*** 
(0.350) 
1.180*** 
(0.353) 
0.831** 
(0.299) 
Winner-Loser (difference in 
seats) 
  
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
Gender (1=female) 
   
0.230 
(0.138) 
Age 
   
0.007 
(0.005) 
Non/primary education (ref.)     
   Secondary education 
   
0.467 
(0.240) 
   Tertiary education 
   
0.501 
(0.234) 
Would vote without obligation 
   
0.093 
(0.209) 
Political knowledge 
   
0.087 
(0.065) 
Campaign exposure 
   
0.396*** 
(0.091) 
Constant 3.005*** 
(0.438) 
2.032*** 
(0.531) 
2.026*** 
(0.533) 
1.127 
(0.622) 
R2 0.287 0.365 0.368 0.469 
N 349 348 347 342 
Source: BEP 2009-2014. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors between 
brackets. Note: *: p≤0.05; **: p≤0.01; ***: p≤0.001 
 
As can be observed in Tables 5 and 6, the results from the 2009-election are confirmed in the 
context of the elections of 2014. Also in 2014, regardless the way winners and losers are 
defined, having voted for a winning or losing party does not significantly influence the 
evolution in political trust. Indicating to continue to turn it if it would not be compulsory 
anymore does not significantly influence the evolution in trust. Having participated in the 
elections and casted a vote for one of the running parties, however, has a significant positive 
impact on political trust. We can therefore be confident that the 2009 results are not caused by 
events that are specific to those elections. 
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6. Discussion 
 
Our initial hypothesis was confirmed: taking part in elections is associated with a significant 
rise in political trust. The prevailing idea in procedural fairness theory receives support: just 
taking part in a procedure that is perceived to be fair and equal boosts trust in the system. 
Elections are the prime example of this democratic ethos, as they comply with the notion that 
everyone is to count for one, and nobody is to count for more than one. Despite a tendency 
toward dealignment, volatility and lower levels of legitimacy, apparently elections still play this 
role. It should be acknowledged, however, that most likely this effect is short-lived. In a larger 
comparative review of the European Social Survey at least, we do not find any relation between 
the frequency of elections and the level of political trust. So although we observe in the current 
study that electoral participation boosts political trust, this should not lead to the conclusion that 
simply multiplying the number of elections would add to this effect.  
Despite the fact that we tried to operationalize the concept of winners and losers in a 
number of ways, we did not find significant differences between supporters of different parties. 
Theoretically this is an interesting finding, because in the literature this distinction is so central. 
The fact that it does not have an effect in the Belgian context might hint at the fact that it is very 
appropriate in a two-party system, but not in a multi-party system. In a two-party system, 
electoral results almost by definition are a zero-sum game: what party A gains, party B must 
lose (if we disregard minor third parties). In a multi-party system, there are no clear winners 
and losers. A party might gain seats, but lose power because another party won even stronger. 
A winning party might not always enter the governing coalition. The apparent result of this 
dynamic is that in Belgium at least we do not find a strong winner-loser difference. 
Theoretically, therefore, it is important to extend these kind of studies to proportional systems 
with a multi-party system, so that results on e.g., the United States are not generalized without 
a sufficient backing. The entire literature is focused too heavily on the distinction between 
winners and losers. But one of the main qualities of the consociational and proportional model 
is that the system tries to avoid creating real losers (Lijphart, 2012). All major groups do remain 
involved in some way or another, and can express satisfaction with electoral results. 
It has to be acknowledged that in this study on Belgium we could not include the impact 
of entering the governing coalition, as (most of the) fieldwork for the post-electoral wave was 
conducted before the new government took office. This is a sharp contrast to the situation in 
the United States or the United Kingdom, where usually it is already clear the morning after 
Election Day who will be the next President or resident of Downing Street 10. It has to be 
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remembered, however, that Belgium in this regard is by no means exceptional. In Western 
Europe, cabinet formation after elections on average takes something like 40 days, and Belgium 
is, in fact, quite average in this regard (Ecker & Meyer, 2015). So in quite a number of 
democracies, voters are confronted with the situation that even after weeks after the elections, 
they still do not know what will be the next governing coalition. As such, there is no reason to 
assume that the Belgian situation would be highly exceptional. Furthermore, we know from 
previous research that when the governing coalition is finally formed, and this might be weeks 
or months after the elections, this does not seem to have any specific effect on levels of political 
trust for the supporters of that party (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2016). 
Our findings might also be theoretically relevant for a broader debate within political 
science. In some of the current literature it has become a habit to downplay the democratic 
potential of elections, in favour of other forms of political participation, and Tormey (2015) has 
even claimed it is time to move beyond the age of electoral representative democracy. Esaiasson 
and Narud (2014) too have argued that it has become more important what citizens do between 
elections, than what they express on election day itself. While self-evidently there are valid 
arguments in this literature, one should not forget that apparently elections do remain 
intrinsically related to the basic function of what democracy is all about. For a large group of 
citizens, especially those with an initially distrustful attitude toward the political system, 
elections are the most obvious example of how citizens can actually determine the decisions of 
the political system. As such it is the prime example of a democratic linkage mechanism 
between citizens and the state. This feeling maybe was expressed most clearly in the famous 
quote of the French president in his last New Year’s eve speech (1995), when he labelled 
elections as: ‘un rendez-vous important que la France se donne à elle-même’. Apparently free 
and fair elections do enjoy a high moral status, and the current analysis suggests that they boost 
political trust. It could be expected that this effect will be short-lived and does not survive the 
entire electoral cycle, but the fact that at least once in every electoral cycle the feeling of 
political trust is reinforced, is a major accomplishment. What is equally important: it is well-
known that for most forms we do observe a strong pattern of social stratification, where the 
most privileged groups tend to participate most intensively. For elections with a very high 
turnout rate, like in Belgium, this is clearly not the case. If more intensive forms of political 
participation can be described as weapon of the happy few (Verba, 2003), elections by 
definition are the weapon of the many. The current analysis even suggests a reverse 
stratification, where the respondents with the lowest initial trust levels profit most strongly from 
electoral participation. From a concern about democratic legitimacy, this is self-evidently the 
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most problematic group, and therefore it is quite promising that this group benefits most 
strongly from the electoral effect. 
A limitation of the current analysis is that it does not yet inform us about the causal 
mechanism that could be responsible for the observed compensation effect. Firstly, it should be 
remembered that electoral campaigns are a period where the mass media report in a very 
intensive manner on politics. This media frenzy could explain why, even for people who are 
not interested in politics at all, in this period it might be difficult to avoid any exposure to 
political news. Secondly, it has to be remembered that Belgium is a stable democracy, where 
the current system of proportional representation is used since the end of the 19th century. This 
centennial tradition provides strong legitimacy to the electoral procedure as such. Future 
research should determine whether we find similar effects in more recent democracies, or in 
countries where the electoral system has been recently changed. Third, a counter-argument 
might be that the winner-loser effect is ultimately dependent on the question whether one’s 
preferred party enters the governing coalition or not, so therefore it should be important to 
conduct panel studies over a longer period of time. Fourth, in the current analysis we relied on 
political trust as a dependent variable. It might indeed be the case that some operationalisation 
of ‘satisfaction with democracy’ would be more prone to be influenced by the winner-loser 
effect, so a further comparison between these two variables is called for. Fifth, if we want to 
test the claim that proportional representation leads to a weakening of the winner-loser effect, 
it would be important to replicate the current study in countries with different scores on the 
proportionality index.  
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